

SECRET

O/2740/25.

9th September, 1941.

Many thanks for sending me a report on subversive organisations in Greece, which, I am sure, will be of great use to my people; also the two reports on Romanian refugees, which are of much interest.

It had occurred to me, in regard to the latter, however, that, seeing that our Balkan organisation are, in point of fact, running Beza and Vulposcu, your local representative might conceivably have discussed the question with Maxwell or Bailey on the spot, before sending in his report. Perhaps he did. Anyhow, I imagine that the liaison will be far better now that Mr. Lyttelton has formed his Committee, on which, as I understand it, both S.O.M and S.I.S., Middle East, are represented.

(Sgd:-) GLADWYN JEBB.

THIS IS A COPY  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958

No. 566.

To: the C.I.O.

From L/DI.

0/25  
4 JUL 1941

NO

**MOST SECRET**

Register  
No.

M.E.W.

PERSONAL

101 August, 1941.

25  
57

Draft. Letter  
To: "D"  
From: Mr. Jeht.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

If what I am told is true, the documents known as I.S.O.S. contain information of the highest possible interest to S.O.U. Indeed, I believe that, of all the Services, S.O.S. would be the most directly interested in I.S.O.S. reports. Since the lives of their agents might very well depend on the information they contain.

Would you, therefore, consider letting Archie Boyle have copies of these reports? Needless to say, he would not circulate them as such to anybody and only pass on the gist to the country section concerned, if necessary. Further, no action of any kind would be taken on such a report without first obtaining your permission.

I think you will agree that Boyle has great experience in handling such matters, and that, from the point of view/-

to my Christian in private N.S. No. 38. Keep in mind 2 for last. 11-1942

137037 7807

vide of security there would be no  
danger at all if you agreed that the  
reports should go to him.

C-1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

No. 565.

To: the U.E.S.

From L/DI.

9/25  
4 JUL 1941

ROD

See Minutes  
NS Minute N:38  
Secret: of 10/7/41

Reference 0/25  
20/55.

MINISTER:

Please see the attached copy of my letter of yesterday, to "C".

C.D. and I raised the question with "C" this-  
afternoon (of Communism), and he said that he would ask  
Colonel Vivian and A.I.5 whether they could produce  
any latest evidence as to the attitude of the Comintern  
in this country or in others. (He thought that 48000  
ought to be able to send in something interesting.)

"C" also said that he, himself, was all in  
favour of using Communists in the present circumstances  
and would have no objection if we dropped a Communist <sup>now</sup>.  
in the occupied area whose function would be to get in  
touch with the Communist workers in Paris or elsewhere.  
He would still, however, be opposed to our getting  
Dolivet to visit this country, for instance, or making  
any approaches to him or to his political associates  
which might be likely to get to the ears of Vichy.  
Nobody really knew if any good would still come from  
the approaches which had been and still were being made  
to Vichy, but he was still working through two channels  
on the direct instructions of the Prime Minister.

"C" finally suggested that the question of our  
attitude towards Communism and the Comintern ought soon  
to be considered by the highest authorities and some  
decision, if possible, extracted from the War Cabinet.

11th July, 1941.

(1) I have seen perhaps how D should visit London  
country. I am only interested to know  
whether his alleged calls in France should be  
contacted.

(2) It is not our policy to have Cabinet for a  
"decision" while C. can give some answer  
to my questions in August N.E. on it. Keep in mind  
of 10/7/41

10/25 (10/25/41)  
10/25 (10/25/41)  
10/25 (10/25/41)  
10/25 (10/25/41)  
10/25 (10/25/41)

No. 566.

To: The C.E.O.

From L/DI.

9/25  
4 JUL 1941

PCD

**MOST SECRET**

4th July, 1941.

Reference 0/25

See Min. Pen's  
N.S. Minute NE38

C.E.O. of 10.7.41

If anything is to come of Communist contacts, dissident or 'orthodox', it will have to be taken up much more strongly and presumably at a higher level. "C" is evidently stalling; it took a month to get an opinion on the desirability of Communist contacts, and then another month to arrange this meeting which seems to have been entirely inconclusive.

PCD

It is not quite clear that the C.E.O. of 10.7.41 is the same as the C.E.O. of 10.7.41.

Consequently, we have to wait to see

whether we can get the C.E.O. of 10.7.41 to do the work of the C.E.O. of 10.7.41.

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958

No. 566.

To: the D.C.D.

From I/DI.

0/25  
2 JUL 1941

RO

**MOST SECRET**

4th July, 1941.

THIS IS A COPY  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958

0/28  
No. 586.

**NOT SECRET**

(Copy)

To, The C. D.

From L/OI.

4th July, 1961.

THIS IS A COPY  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
9 (1) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958

1st July 1941.

Dear C/D,

Yours of June 30th re Communist Party.

I consulted Colonel Vivian on this, as he is the Communist expert here. He tells me that he is meeting one or more of your officers tomorrow, July 2nd on this very subject and will discuss it in detail.

In the meantime may I give you the following generalities. I have in the past frequently endeavoured to get some good (i.e. information) out of Communists. I have found them most ineffective, even when willing. It is chiefly because the information they produce contains some effort to prove their own case. Their promises - and there were many - never materialise.

At the time of the Munich crisis they were most prolific with promises, not only as regards information but even action in the event of war breaking out. Nothing happened. This covers Communists of all countries. The Germans, I found a long way the most ineffective.

Nevertheless, for your particular task, I cannot see why you should not try and use them, but (and I think it is a big "but") they need to be strictly insulated and not permitted in any way to penetrate your organisation.

Perhaps you will think this injunction rather a statement of the obvious, because of course it is just what they would like to do.

Yours ever,

KCS



AME/KA/512.

25.6.41.

Copy to CEO

SECRET.

30 JUN 1941

7 JUL 1941

30th June 1941.

CO. to CEO

Communist Party

Communist Party.

As instructed in  
SOP comment on  
attached - I  
enclose herewith a  
brief account of  
a meeting with  
Calhoun and  
LOS, L9, & L9c.

It doesn't get  
us very far!

By the time Calhoun  
evolves his policy,  
he will probably be  
overlaid by the course  
of events!

I am returning 7/7 the attached

thing of a quarry as to how we stand  
meeting the Communist Party qua the

very complex problem and I am being pressed  
give some kind of a directive on the subject  
endeavour to contact the "Communists" with  
ing that they play at suborning Nazi seamen.

and I am being pressed  
to whether we should not use the so-called  
th and South America with a view to  
stivation.

first job as always is to keep in step with  
you could give me a directive as to how S.I.S.  
problem it might clear my mind as to the

at the moment spoken to Swinton direct - in  
point of doing so this morning when I thought  
ould more properly ask S.I.S. through you  
they are taking vis-a-vis this problem.

C.D.

AKR/XI/512.

26.6.41.

Copy to CED

*Mr. 37*  
*Q.B.*  
SECRET.

7th June 1941

*a pertinent question*  
*Let me see the answer 5:37*  
30th June 1941.

Dear A.C.F.S.,

Communist Party.

I am in something of a quandary as to how we stand in regard to contacting the Communist Party and the Communist Party!

This is a very complex problem and I am being pressed by my people to give some kind of a directive on the subject i.e., should we endeavour to contact the "Communists" with a view to suggesting that they play at suborning Nazi seamen.

The U.S.A. comes into this - and I am being pressed for a directive as to whether we should not use the so-called Communists in North and South America with a view to countering Nazi activities.

I think my first job as always is to keep in step with S.I.S. - and if you could give me a directive as to how S.I.S. are viewing this problem it might clear my mind as to the immediate future.

I have not at the moment spoken to Swinton direct - in fact I was on the point of doing so this morning when I thought that perhaps I should more properly ask S.I.S. through you what action if any they are taking vis-a-vis this problem.

(C.D.)



0/25

0/2225/25

AD/Z  
----


Many thanks for your advice as to the reply which I should return to Arnold-Forster's complaint about the keeping of "C" reports. I duly got this off on the lines suggested.

Yesterday evening I had a telephone call on the subject from . He said that he understood that we were in the habit of making copies of these reports for circulation at Baker Street. I told him that I knew nothing of this, adding that I felt that the story was probably quite unfounded. I promised, however, to look into the matter.

said that "C" carefully numbers all the copies of the reports which he sends out, and for security reasons considers it generally unwise to allow any extra copies to be made, even for internal use in any particular organisation to whom the numbered copies may be sent. I told him that I thought we would be able to give him an assurance that we would strictly observe this condition, and that if by any chance, in any particular case, we wished an exception to be made, we would first refer the matter to him. I hope you will agree with this. In any case I have promised to telephone to again and should be glad if you would let me know what you think before I do so.

(Sgd) PHILIP BROAD

9th May 1941.



SECRET & PERSONAL

0/25

From G.D.

GD/OR/373

AD/A. AD/Z, AD/1.

4th May 1941

0/2203/25

7th May 1941

SECRET and PERSONAL

I am sorry that I have not been able to send an earlier reply to your letter of the 27th April (7/1969) about CX report No. 24 addressed to the American Department of the Foreign Office.

I am afraid that I must plead guilty to leaving with the Foreign Office, actually in Hopkinson's room, a copy of this report which had been handed to me at Baker Street to take down to the Foreign Office as aide-memoire for use in a conversation with them. I was not aware of the rule to which you refer in para 2. and am extremely sorry that it should have been broken.

I will do my best to ensure that we are not guilty of any repetition of this offence.

(Sgd) PHILIP HENNING

Commander C. Arnold-Forster, R.A.,

SECRET & URGENT

0/25

From C.D.  
To C.E.O., AD/A, AD/2, AD/1,  
M, D/Fin X, E, S, D/T.

CD, JN/373

4th May 1941

Liaison with C.

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USE OF THE PUBLIC HEARD  
ACT 1958

1. As a result of conversations which took place between C.E.O., C.S.S. and the writer last week - I had a long interview with the A.C. S.S. Colonel Dansey yesterday, and as a result I think we are entitled to assume that the following procedure will operate from now onwards for the future."

A. Liaison between C. and S.O.2 will be through the sole channel of Colonel Dansey (this is officially agreed by C.S.S. and C.E.O.).

B. Initial Liaison will be between Section Heads of S.O.2 and C. (and also of course by subordinates in the various Sections under authority of the relevant Section Heads).

C. Routine decisions of importance will be reported to or referred to Colonel Dansey, and in so far as S.O.2 Sections are concerned these will be referred to or reported to Regional Heads, viz. AD/A, AD/2, X, S.

D. Where any difference of opinion arises between an S.O.2 Section and a C. Section, Colonel Dansey will arbitrate - and if his decision cannot be accepted by the Section Head or Regional Head of S.O.2 or C., as the case may be, such a decision goes up for discussion in the first instance between C.S.S. and C.D.

E. If C.S.S. and C.D. cannot arrive at a decision it then goes up to Higher Quarters through C.E.O. so far as S.O.2 is concerned.

F. Colonel Dansey will act for all C. Sections, i.e., even those over whom he has at the present time no direct jurisdiction - and to make this perhaps clearer it should be added that Colonel Dansey's liaison will extend to and what may be called for want of a better term "shipping".

G. Colonel Dansey will be immediately given a room in this building which should be labelled "C" - and although he may not use it himself to any routine extent, i.e. daily visits, it was his suggestion that the room should be large enough for a conference of five or six people when these were made necessary as between C. and S.O.2, either with or without his presence.

H. Colonel Dansey will provide his own Secretary who will sit permanently in this room and deal with tele. calls, appointments etc.

2. During the course of my conference with Colonel Dansey an interview with [redacted] and Squadron-Leader Long was sandwiched, and as an initial effort I found Colonel Dansey's presence of the very greatest assistance. It was arranged at this interview that Squadron-Leader Long of C., [redacted] should have direct contact with Section Heads of S.O.2 so that he may be clearly informed on all details connected with S.O.2 wireless operators who are to be dropped or sent overseas, to elaborate this a little, Squadron-Leader Long explained that consistent with the necessary secrecy it will be of great assistance to him if he can be informed of the type of duty which each S.O.2 wireless operator will be expected to undertake, together with an idea of the territory from which he will send his messages, and so on and so forth.

3. E. of course will be present at any of these interviews between Squadron-Leader Long and S.O.2 Section Heads, should all three parties concerned desire this, but such interviews are not primarily intended to cover technical matters.

4. I also arranged - and I consider this very important - that provided S.O.2 can obtain from the Army two instructors, classed B.1. (if possible civilian operators before they 'joined up') [redacted] will train these instructors so that in due course S.O.2 can use them at any of S.O.2 stations for instructing S.O.2 wireless operators.

5. I hope that this suggestion of mine may do away to a large extent with the difficulties of sending fully trained agents for a course of wireless to [redacted] which is bad for their discipline and only gives them a few hours work each day.

6. I have promised [redacted] that as soon as possible this week a considered statement shall be given to them of:-

- a) Urgent requirements for the June moon in enemy occupied territory in Western Europe.
- b) Pressing requirements elsewhere.
- c) Long term requirements.

7. I would ask that this should be very carefully dealt with - by which I mean that whilst our original request for a comparatively large number of suitcase wireless sets etc. for the Far East is perfectly reasonable and was quite clearly stated - whatever the reason may be and whoever may be to blame in C., it is obvious that large blocks of wireless sets cannot be issued by C. in a hurry for the simple reason that they do not possess them.

8. In regard to the purchase and use of wireless sets elsewhere, I desire that this should be discussed in the first instance with Colonel Dansey, and I have reason to believe that there will be no difficulties over this if it goes through this channel.

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3.4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958

9. There are to the memorandum a copy of letter 1. I wish, I was able to see very early but it is not possible. I was able to see it the first time, and I should have a great time with Colonel Dansey to that he try at the complete picture of the situation to the long term basis. On the other hand, we have a great deal of time and effort in the Far Eastern Division, it is completely misunderstood at present by the whole of the C. Organisation.

10. Will A/A, A/L, S, X, B and L/T please co-operate very fully on the basis of this memorandum so that all necessary details such as the immediate provision of a room for C. - the communication to Section 10 of the new liaison - consideration of the very important memorandum on our present and future work - wireless sets etc. - should be dealt with with expedition and a great deal of tact. I think it would be an admirable thing if the officers were asked to call and entertain Colonel Dansey to a small dinner to initiate this new liaison and at the same time to discuss ways and means of smoothing out the wrinkles of the past and avoiding the wrinkles of the future.

11. It is hardly necessary to add that D/T's functions for the future will be even more important than the past and I should like to see Colonel Dansey's intention to have an early conversation with D/T on matters of routine and detail.

C. D.



C. D. S.

C. I. O.

20

April, 1941.

*C/D hopes that he is just part of a regular  
has interest in making a definite step forward  
regard to cooperation with C in some*

*See D. S. S.*

80 APR 1941

C/2

From C.D.

CL/CR/178

To C.A.O.

30th April 1941.

Liaison with C.

1. The attached is copy of a memorandum sent to me by D.T. (our Liaison Officer with C.), which I think puts our case very fairly.
2. Perhaps you would consider whether on Friday afternoon - if and when we see C. - we might put this matter to him without a self-evidently pointing out that the situation is not any more nor less than the elimination of Arnold Foster and Vivian as the canalizing officers through whom all S.O.2 matters pass at present at Broadway.
3. A.C.S.S. tells me very definitely (and this is confirmed by C.C.S.), that each of all Sections in C are now more than prepared to play seriously with S.O.2 as between Section leads, and that the elimination of Arnold Foster and Vivian would be welcomed by everybody at C.
4. I think it likely that C. may raise the point that matters of principle may be settled by the Section leads in this way - which could ordinarily pass through some of the Executive leads.
5. I think this can be answered by the statement that no matter of principle can be decided in C. - unless it goes through the A.C.S.S., who is responsible for all the Section with which we are primarily concerned i.e. France, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Spain.

*This closer liaison  
should have been possible from  
the beginning, but C's people  
have consistently opposed it. D  
some hope of an improvement,  
which he has now up at once. (C/D)  
perhaps*

27th April, 1941.

*C/O hopes that he is justified in regarding this interview as marking a distinct step forward in regard to co-operation with C in communications matters*

C.D. S. H.

C.S.S.

C. P. E.C.O.

DT/31/748

1. I discussed yesterday to some extent with C.S.S. and to a considerable extent with C.O.S. the need of increased liaison between S.O.2. sections and 'C' sections.

C.S.S. appears to have no fundamental objection to this and C.O.S. is ardently in favour of it, as I am myself.

2. It seems to me that it would be better if the move came from yourself. Would you have any objection either to writing to C.S.S. or speaking to him at your next meeting on Friday, May 2nd, on the following lines?

"In order to ensure full co-operation between S.I.S. and S.O.2. and to ensure that lines are not crossed, it seems of paramount importance that there should be direct liaison between the respective country sections of the two organisations.

"At the present moment there seems to be a certain amount of information available to one organisation which should be automatically available to the other.

"Also, there seems to be a need for closer co-operation regarding the actual handling of agents by one organisation or the other, all the more so now as the areas for recruiting agents become more limited. The ever increasing amount of work carried out by country sections in both organisations makes it almost impossible to canalize all liaison through single individuals."

3. A good case in point is the handling of new arrivals at the Royal Patriotic Schools. There, Major THORNTON does a quick preliminary interrogation and indicates whether a new arrival is likely to be of more value to S.O.2. or S.I.S.

Actually, of course, nobody can make a final decision of this nature until a most detailed interrogation has been carried out. This interrogation should be done by S.I.S. and S.O.2. in co-operation and even if it is decided that the man is of more value to S.O.2. he is bound to have a lot of information of value to S.I.S. Alternatively, a man earmarked for S.I.S. may have special information which might be of value for an S.O.2. project.

It is only by the two sections concerned working hand in hand that the best results can be obtained.

D/T  
29.4.41.

S.E.C.

11 April, 1941.

C/D notes that he is justified in regarding this interview as marking a distinct step forward in regard to co-operation with C in communications matters.

C.D. to Bureau

S. D. AF 1040

AC

From C.D.

CD/OR/178

To C.A.D.

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5. I think this can be answered by the statement that no matter of principle can be decided in C. unless it goes through the A.C.2, who is responsible for all the Sections with which we are primarily concerned i.e., France, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Spain.

C. D.

W. H. J.

18.

*C/D notes that he is just part in regarding  
his interview as making a definite step forward in  
regard to co-operation with C in communications matter*

C.D.'s

I am a C.S.S. member

XZ

C.D.

C.D.

DT/CX/745

1. I discussed yesterday to some extent with C.S.S. and to a considerable extent with C.D.S. the need of increased liaison between S.I.S. sections and 'C' sections.

C.S.S. appears to have no fundamental objection to this and C.D.S. is ardently in favour of it, as I am myself.

2. It seems to me that it would be better if the move came from yourself. As you have any objection either to writing it up, or speaking to him at your next meeting on Friday, May 2nd, on the following lines?

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3. A good case in point is the handling of new arrivals at the Home Patriotic Schools. There, Major T. [redacted] does a quick preliminary interrogation and indicates whether a new arrival is likely to be of more value to S.O.S. or S.I.S.

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It is only by the two sections concerned working hand in hand that the best results can be obtained.

S/T  
29.4.41.

R.H.C.

CD/CR/385.

C E O.

20,

25th April, 1941.

C/O notes that he is justified in regarding  
this interview as marking a distinct step forward in  
regard to co-operation with C in communications matters.

C.O.'S WEEKLY MEETING WITH C.B.S. APRIL 25TH.

AT

RECEIVED ALL H Q  
11 11 11

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,  
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE  
BERKELEY SQUARE W 1

Ad/2 to Mr. Brown

Very different  
I think that  
you should say  
to that you have  
no view of such  
a letter but will  
obtain it in his  
future - ie  
I should start  
to come!!

3/4/41

afraid I have rather gone a

Yours ever

Harry Brown

20th April, 1951.

C/D hopes that he is justified in regarding this interview as marking a distinct step forward in regard to co-operation with C in communications matters.

C.D.'s thanks are given to Mr. C.S.S., on 20.4.51.

KL

In any case, the communication will be sent to the relevant authorities.

Yours faithfully,

Mr. C.D.

General Manager, British Overseas Airways Corporation

London

Tele. 4-1111

F. 10.2.51  
A. ROSS (N. 10.10.51)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, WHITEHALL

BRITISH OVERSEAS AIRWAYS CORPORATION

GENERAL MANAGER, LONDON

My dear Sir,

I have received your letter of the 17th inst. regarding the proposed visit of the British Overseas Airways Corporation to the Ministry of Defence, and in reply to inform you that the visit has been approved.

The visit will take place on the 20th inst. and will be held in the Ministry of Defence, Whitehall.

I am sure that the visit will be most profitable and that you will be able to discuss the proposed visit of the British Overseas Airways Corporation to the Ministry of Defence.

I am, Sir, very truly yours,

Yours faithfully,  
Mr. C.D.

Yours truly

Mr. C.D.

26 APR 1964

CW notes that he is justified in regarding these interviews as marking a distinct step forward in regard to co-operation in the C in communications matters.

C.D. & W. H. H. H. H. H. C.S.S., JUL 29

AL

28 APR 1941

THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLES

1900-1901

I have been asked to write to you on the following matter.

3.4.41, in regard to the Art Committee, and addressed to the American Department of the Foreign Office, was copied and sent by the Foreign Office with a request for action. It is considered here and at the Foreign Office that it is most dangerous to copy these secret reports and to increase the numbers in issue. I am on the understanding that these reports are issued from here, numbered for the same reason.

reports be copied in future, I  
reassure my Chief?

out that in fact  
that the price  
is indeed is  
that are

the 12 are  
said to

Why I be ...  
on this point

Amstel. Gen. ltr.

*C.D. notes that he is justified in regarding this interview as making a distinct step forward in regard to co-operation with C in communications matters*

C.D.'S WEEKLY MEETING WITH C.S.S., APRIL 25TH.

This is being circulated to every man of Section who is interested and C.D. expects him to take immediate action.

1. Perwick of C would like to know immediately if there is any chance of obtaining a Spaniard who is either a trained or semi-trained wireless operator, or failing this, if amongst the Spaniards there are any who at the Pioneer Station Station - there is any intelligent Spaniard who would be able to put through a quick intensive course of wireless to make him available to be sent to Spain either with any of our lots, when sent, or, or separately.
  2. There is, I understand, a specific reason for this but I do not know what it is. I have the C.S.S.'s permission to broadcast it, it was, however, a connection with a transmitting set that is hidden somewhere in Spain but requires an operator.
  3. If any Section head has occasion to telephone overseas for information as to any specific person or persons I want the name or names to be first of all referred to Cowall of C, in case these people are already in his files, which will save time and trouble and line-crossing to all concerned.
  4. Will AD/Z kindly see that a copy of the Far Eastern Charter is sent to C.S.S. - but still better would be if we could find the time to take it personally to the C.S.S. for a special chat over the whole project. This arises out of a request by E for a large number of wireless sets for the Far Eastern Mission, and it is well known a far greater chance of getting a set to us regarding a proportion of what was asked for if C.S.S. and some of his people know what we are trying to do by means of the Far Eastern Mission.
  5. Will the French, Belgian and Dutch Sections who purpose to drop wireless operators in any of their respective countries during the next few months advise Colonel Dansey of C of their plans to advise to send as wireless sets are concerned. If we can have two or three of these sets should be sent as a gift to the French, Belgian or Dutch, reason to believe that their demands will be met. In this connection it should be explained to each wireless operator going across that he should not expect daily contact, i.e., he should not expect to be listened for seven days in the week.
- It should also be arranged with him that in cases where he can be heard here but he cannot hear us - a simple signal, such as the playing of a certain tune on the P.D.C. trumpet or on the horn, or on the radio, be arranged as an intimation that we have heard him although he has not been able to hear us.



[illegible]

8. I desire to say so that our wireless sets from C with which our people or men can be used to a certain extent for obtaining intelligence to C and also to the Government of the U.S.A. in a very short course to know people, or to identify troops by signals, tanks, aeroplanes, by numbers on the wings, etc., etc., which is the type of information we would be very grateful to have.
9. I desire the fullest collaboration from all Section heads on this matter, for it is obvious that if C are interested in getting information for themselves we shall have a large degree of co-operation from them in equipping our people with wireless and giving them adequate reception from C and so.

C. F.

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21st April, 1941.

1. Subversive operations are being conducted in three different groups of territories:-

- a). Countries defeated or occupied by the Axis are hostile to the invader and therefore provide the best material for subversion. Our objects here are to prepare the populations and train the forces of the enemy; (ii) to encourage passive resistance.
- b. Certain neutral countries at present threatened by the Axis are here a limited field for diplomatic considerations. Our objects are to combat the political pressure of the Axis powers, to encourage resistance to invasion so that enemy forces are held up and embarrassed as much as possible, and to lay the foundations of successful revolt should the territory in question be occupied by the enemy.
- c). Enemy countries. Here our final goal is internal disruption. But at present in this early stage of the war it is difficult to organise sabotage and impossible to provoke revolution. For the moment we have to be content with putting out secret propaganda, with making use of immigrant labour to act as a disruptive element and with training Italians and Germans for eventual action in their native territories.

2. Subversive warfare is by its very nature an offensive weapon. Moreover it can take many different forms; even if one line of action is checked, another can be developed. It is therefore unwise to think only in terms of eventual risings. The right policy is continual and increasing agitation. While all possible preparation must be made for general risings, it will not be in our interest that these should occur for a long time to come. Meanwhile we must press on with subversive activities and sabotage of every kind, including every method of production, bad workmanship, administrative muddling, as well as more open and violent action. While taking care not to provoke the enemy into severely repressive measures, we must harass him to the maximum extent and over the widest possible areas.

3. Among the countries occupied or defeated by the Axis powers, the existing situation and the future prospects of subversion differ considerably.

POLAND. Hatred of Germany is violent and universal and the whole population intensely patriotic. A military organisation to conduct subversion and sabotage in the event of defeat was established six months before the outbreak of war. Some arms have been obtained locally,

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I have been thinking about you a great deal lately, and wondering how you are getting on. I hope you are well and happy. I have been very busy lately, but I always find time to think of my friends. I am sure you are doing just as well as possible. I am looking forward to seeing you again soon. I am sure you will be in good luck. I am sure you will be in good luck. I am sure you will be in good luck.

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EXPLAN The second part of the report is a detailed explanation of the work done during the last year. It is a very long and detailed explanation, but it is a good one.

SUMMARY The third part of the report is a summary of the work done during the last year. It is a very short and simple summary, but it is a good one.

The fourth part of the report is a summary of the work done during the last year.

ITALY The fifth part of the report is a summary of the work done during the last year. It is a very short and simple summary, but it is a good one.

GERMANY The sixth part of the report is a summary of the work done during the last year. It is a very short and simple summary, but it is a good one.

The seventh part of the report is a summary of the work done during the last year. It is a very short and simple summary, but it is a good one.

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In promoting subversion against the enemy, S.O.E. recently handicapped by short... of the Chiefs of Staff... The S.O.E. would say whether... available the men and... out.

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Elat April, 1941.

THE PROSPECTS OF SUBVERSION1. FIELDS OF ACTION

(a) An increasing weakness of the Axis, and more particularly of Germany; is the occupation of vast areas of Europe where the defeated population hates the invader, and where armed force is required not only to keep order but also to compel the peoples to work.

(b) Further, the Axis, having embarked on total warfare, is trying to make the greatest use even of those countries which are still neutral to further its policy and aid its war effort, materially or politically. Thus neutral countries have been brought within the scope of subversive warfare, and though on balance the Axis may there hold the initial advantage, our greater resources in raw materials, in facilities for trade, and in sea communications will enable us eventually to turn the scales. The further development of air transport facilities - which are most urgently required - will hasten this end.

(c) Even in the enemy countries themselves, where direct action by S.O.E. is obviously most difficult, the foundation of the existing régimes by means of unbridled violence, ferocity and injustice has, of necessity, entailed the creation of dissidence, discontent or disgust, however carefully concealed. These will in the final issue, and with proper encouragement, bring their own aftermath. Here the function of S.O.E. is to help the chickens to come home to roost.

2. Thus there are (in order of their present importance) three fields in which subversive warfare is now being conducted, viz -

(a) Defeated and occupied territories, including Roumania, Bulgaria and others, where there was no organised armed resistance.

(b) Neutral countries, including Spain and others, where there is intense political pressure by the Axis, or where pressure is likely to become acute at some future date.

(c) The home lands of the Axis Powers.

3. PLACES AND METHODS OF SUBVERSIVE WARFARE

These vary widely, not only between the three broad groups above, but also in accordance with local conditions within the different groups. Each country can be considered on its individual merits and treatment.

Following distinctions, the following distinctions are made:

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#### 4. INITIATIVE IN THE FIELD OF SUBVERSIVE WARFARE

The possible fields of action, the various aims, and the methods of attack have been outlined above. As regards the timing and the intensity of our activities, a decisive factor by its very nature has the irresistible attraction that it is always possible to be on the offensive, and to take the initiative in spite of the lead that the Axis has been allowed to gain. Indeed it may shortly, and for some considerable time, be the only field in which we are able to take any "military" initiative on land (as distinct, of course, from the initiative on sea or in the air). Subversion has the further advantage that, if countered in one direction, it can continue in another, or if checked in one form, i.e. overt sabotage, some other is possible, e.g. clandestine sabotage, etc. Even if all activity should be momentarily checked, secret propaganda is still possible, and needless to say propaganda and action - S.O.1 and S.O.2 - are closely co-ordinated and work hand in hand. It is therefore possible for subversive warfare to be carried out in a number of ways, and in the circumstances dictated by particular circumstances and in keeping with the general situation.

It follows that a consideration at any given moment of the "probable state of readiness and ability of certain countries to rise against the Nazi regime" is not by itself a sufficient basis for strategy. Sabotage and subversive warfare generally are, in the case of many countries, and for long will remain, much more to our advantage, both future and immediate, than a national rising. While keeping the eventual object in view and working towards that end, we are (within the limits of discretion and of general policy) in the meanwhile exploiting all immediate possibilities in order to attack our enemies now and maintain our offensive.

So, for the purpose of this paper, that is to say, for assessing the value of the factor of subversive warfare in the general appreciation of future strategy, we must take into our account for each country the situation regarding subversion existing today and its future possibilities\*. The countries concerned are dealt with seriatim below.

#### 5. EXISTING SITUATION AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

##### (a) Occupied Territories

##### (1) POLAND

The whole Polish population is violently anti-German, and patriotic feeling is intense. No attempt has been or will be made to compromise with the enemy in any way.

Six months before the outbreak of war, i.e. in April 1939, the organisation of a secret military movement was

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\* N.B. No attempt is here made to deal with the nature of subversive propaganda, since that is the specific province of S.O.1. The latter are, however, in agreement with the general policy embodied in this document.



[illegible]

$$m_{\pi^0} = 137.036 \text{ MeV} \quad m_{\pi^\pm} = 139.570 \text{ MeV} \quad m_{\pi^\pm} = 139.570 \text{ MeV}$$
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of Britain, including the British Labour Party, who  
have led the struggle for anti-racist-national  
solidarity, are also provided with W.I. tools

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Even though the situation will worsen and, regretfully, we will have to take more drastic measures to deal with the situation, we must not lose sight of the fact that there is still a great deal of work to be done in order to further the development of the country and to stimulate resistance to the enemy.

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with these elements and the Dutch side, for various reasons, it is not possible to make contact with them at the moment to decide on the tempo of our operations. But the German grip on Holland is strong, and generally the prospects for subversive action this year may be said to be not very great.

There is little first-hand information about subversive activities in Holland, but it is evident, from the press, that centres of resistance do exist and that anti-German feeling is widespread. Contact has not yet been established, but the forces and agents are under training and should be in the field shortly. Passive resistance will be encouraged in the first instance and acts of sabotage left for a later date. For the rapid growth of a passive resistance network, intensive propaganda will be necessary and it is hoped that S.O.1 will soon institute a Belgian Freedom Station.

As is probably the case with most countries, Belgian will to resist varies in accordance with reports of British victories or defeats. It is only the cream of the population who will maintain their faith in the face of British defeats. On the whole not a great deal can be expected in Belgium for some time and pending a considerable German defeat. Many Flemings are pro-German and many Walloons are defeatist. A national consciousness exists, but it will require great stimulation before it really counts as a factor in the struggle with Germany.

#### (X) DENMARK

The Danes, following the tame capitulation of their Government, have taken a long time to find their national consciousness, partly because the Germans have been less brutal to them than to the other peoples in occupied lands, and have bought their agricultural produce at good prices on paper in such a way as to make it hard for Danish agricultural interests to perceive that the whole thing is a gigantic swindle.

Nevertheless, the Danish national spirit is now growing satisfactorily, and "cold shoulder" tactics against the Germans (which the latter fortunately find extremely offensive) are spreading rapidly.

S.O.2 are in touch with Danish organisations and are fostering this spirit and teaching the art of passive resistance of every kind. It is perhaps unlikely that we shall be able to go much beyond this in Denmark unless we are provided with a reliable air support. We are training Danes in this country as organisers and parachutists and, if ever there were a possibility of an offensive against the Germans in this country, we should have a number of saboteurs and Fifth Column men available with the necessary reception committees inside the country.

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(x1) FORNAY

Of all the countries with which we have to deal  
with her long indented coastline and its proximity to  
Great Britain, our interests are comparatively small, and  
perhaps the most important, at least to all residents, the  
western coast is the most fertile, perhaps a measure of  
ever increasing importance, standing at the highest pos-  
sible level of development, which is aided by  
the small islands, it is not a surprise that people  
on but to hold them back.

As in Poland, with which country there are some points of resemblance, the system of the Polish public order is of the same type, but it falls into two distinct parts, as follows:-

1. A long term policy of preparation for a simultaneous uprising all over Norway on the occasion of (but on no account in advance of) either a landing by an Allied expeditionary force, or an incipient German collapse. For these purposes the indigenous anti-Nazi organisations in Norway are being primarily reserved, and we are endeavouring so far as possible to equip, train and organise them to that end.
2. A short term policy of surreptitious sabotage, both active and passive, and for co-operation with and assistance for air raids, or "tip-and-run" landings on the Norwegian coast.

Surreptitious sabotage in Norway is well under way. Passive resistance to the Germans is in full swing and developing fast. To complete the short term portion of the policy it is hoped to organize as many air raids, and "hit-and-run" incursions against important objectives in the Lofoten model, as may be practicable, although much of this activity must necessarily be postponed until the autumn owing to the short Norwegian summer nights. Large numbers of Norwegians are now under training for such raids (e.g. on fish factories) which will hit the Germans quite hard as well as encourage the morale of the local inhabitants.

It is assumed that the locking up of a number of German Divisions in Norway, which will be the result of this short term policy, will be desirable from the strategic point of view.

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On the other hand, Switzerland is of great importance from which to organize a rebellion. The Swiss are in touch with organizations in the first two of the above mentioned areas.

### III. S. T. I.

The Swedes are a democratic free democracy, and so are the Norwegians. They are also, to an extent, a free people. They are, however, not a free people. They are, however, not a free people. They are, however, not a free people.

On the other hand, the Swedes are not at peace for a very long time. They are not at peace for a very long time. They are not at peace for a very long time. They are not at peace for a very long time. They are not at peace for a very long time.

An improvement in our own position in Sweden has occurred since last June. This is partly due to Allied success and partly to the result of small economic concessions to the Swedes. As a result of this policy we have obtained certain definite concessions, including Swedish co-operation in the production of the German aircraft from the German aircraft "P. 109". In addition, the Swedish Government has an international centre needs no further help.

Consequently, S.O.E. must not let us shall continue to bolster up Swedish resistance to German advance by a blind of confidence and a refusal to see beyond the horizon. However, the Swedish Government is not a free people. They are not a free people. They are not a free people.

Hence present subversive operations for Sweden must be partly confined to making plans for the sabotage of important objectives in the event of German occupation of the country or part of it, and if possible should also include clandestine work with the Swedish Government to assist their own subversive organizations in such an event.

But Sweden is also a very important vantage point for information about and communication with Germany. It is a very important vantage point for information about and communication with Germany. It is a very important vantage point for information about and communication with Germany.

The Swedish public is not a free people. They are not a free people. They are not a free people. They are not a free people. They are not a free people.

of judicious carrots, persuade the Swedish Government to wink at our efforts on behalf of their neighbours.

#### 11) FINLAND

The issue regarding this small power is confused by consideration of sentiment aroused by her courageous resistance to Russian aggression during the recent war.

It is a truism that Finnish policy is conditioned by fear of Russia and this fact, coupled with Finland's geographical position and her difficulty in obtaining supplies during the postwar period, when they are particularly badly needed, accounts for her present close relations with our enemies. The desire for peace in Finland is too strong for her friendship with Germany to be based upon an affinity of outlook. The Germans supply Finland with many of her necessities, in particular anti-tank guns and other armaments, and accidently cultivate the notion in Finland that there will be no event or armed conflict between Germany and the Soviets, from which, if Finland is friendly to Germany to-day, she is bound to benefit. They also cultivate the impression that if Russia should again attack Finland the Germans will no longer passively acquiesce, but will help the Finns to resist.

As a result of this policy, Germany is obtaining from Finland certain economic advantages, as well as valuable transit rights which simplify extremely her problem of reinforcing and relieving her garrisons in northern Norway.

On the other hand the Finns are able to import small quantities of goods and to keep a communication with the western world through Petsamo, and this communication is being used by us as a lever to obtain from them compensating economic advantages and (what is from the S.O. angle more important) the maintenance of the present system whereby the Finns allow us to have "Trade Inspectors" at important points throughout Finland.

Consequently S.O.E. desire to use the Trade Inspectors as the nucleus of a native organisation to be used for the following purposes:

- 1) To interfere by sly means, and, so far as possible by "natural" means, with Finnish supplies for Germany, and notably nickel from Petsamo
- 2) To create dumps of explosives, arms and other equipment to be used, in the event of Finland becoming completely dominated by Germany, for a general sabotage campaign to be carried on with the assistance of Finnish anti-Nazi elements.
- 3) To gain detailed intelligence regarding the best methods of attacking important installations, so as to be completely prepared with plans for sabotage to be put into operation at the appropriate time.
- 4) To act as channels for the organisation of subversive operations in North Norway

Generally speaking the maintenance of Finnish neutrality is not, from the S.O. point of view, quite as important as

the maintenance of Swedish neutrality. Moreover, it is submitted that the importance of certain Finnish supplies

(111) Soviet Union

For obvious reasons it is not possible for S.O.E. to operate at present within the Soviet Union, but we are, however, exploring the possibility of sending a representative who would be attached to the British Embassy in Moscow.

This officer would, in the initial stages, do nothing but keep his eyes open, but in the event of the Soviet authorities becoming well disposed towards us, he would endeavour to get in touch with the OGPU and to arrange joint action in the Middle East and elsewhere. This is perhaps a faint hope, but provided we get hold of the right man, we think the idea is worth pursuing.

#### (c) Enemy Countries

##### (i) ITALY

British successes undoubtedly caused something like despair among the Italian population, but no active opposition to their régime or to their German allies is likely to result. Even before the German victories in North Africa and in the Balkans, despair in Italy was tending to fade into apathy, and Italians, however discontented, were looking to the Germans for salvation against their common foe. In fact, there is no doubt that Italians as a whole still see no alternative to the Fascist : line but chaos or Communism; they believe that the Germans alone will protect them against death and ruin, and, rightly or wrongly, they assume that a German victory would result in a better post-war position for Italy than a defeat inflicted by the British Empire.

These feelings have not been seriously weakened by internal conditions. The Fascist régime has been at great pains to provide that war restrictions are not too onerous, that there is sufficient food and even sufficient amusement. Special steps have been taken, for instance, to keep open Opera Houses and Cinemas so that the Italian may well say to himself that he is better placed than the Londoner. Hence it is not surprising that there is no sign of active disaffection, even among the working classes. Certainly, elements and organisations could be encouraged and strengthened for action in the future, but in order that such elements may act effectively, a first essential is that communication should be established with them. Various steps have already been taken to this end, and we are, for instance, encouraging small groups of workers to indulge in subversive activities. In addition, we hope shortly to get in touch with very high authorities in Italy in order to organise opposition to the Fascist régime and to the German occupation.

Since there is obviously at present no prospect of military operations against metropolitan Italy, three courses remain. They are:

- 1) Intensive propaganda.
- 2) The establishment of contacts and infiltration of agents.
- 3) Attacks on as large a scale as possible by the Navy and the R.A.F., with the object of changing the present apathy into fear.

There is no doubt that (3), if possible, would greatly assist (1) and (2), which S.O.E. are already pursuing to the best of their ability. In addition, volunteers have been recruited, and will shortly be under training, for counter-espionage or subversive activities either in Italy itself or in whatever still remains of the Italian Empire.

The occupation of Yugoslavia has, of course, hindered our work in Italy very considerably, and the occupation of Spain would be an even greater blow; but so long as we have our representative in Switzerland (q.v.) it should be possible for us to work certain lines, while actual infiltration from the air could always be carried out from Malta

#### (ii) GERMANY

Germany, hardest nut to crack from the military point of view, is also the hardest from the point of view of subversive warfare. At the moment probably not more than one German in ten has any suspicion that Germany may after all be going to lose the war. Listless and apathetic they well may be; but confidence in victory is only equalled by an acute appreciation of what is likely to happen to Germans in the event of defeat

Given this outlook there is very little that can usefully be done in Germany, beyond propaganda, at the present time. A certain amount of sabotage has in fact been organised in Austria from Slovenia, but this must now necessarily cease. Apart from this, preparatory work is being undertaken to organise the various Socialist and Democratic Parties, and to prepare productive schemes for sabotaging the administration and for bribery. In addition, American business men are visiting Germany in order to report on various aspects interesting to us.

In such circumstances, however, it would be useless to drop agents or "organisers". Even if they were not caught, they could achieve little good. All this may well be possible later, when the absence of German victory, or even German defeats, have prepared the way for subversion, and when intensive bombing has undermined the rather brittle German morale. In the meantime we shall naturally select and train our "organisers", keep all possible lines open, and do such propaganda damage as we may.

#### RECENT EVENTS

Recent events have shown that in the last six months subversive action against the Axis has made considerable progress and is making a definite contribution towards the destruction of the war effort of our enemies. Progress is necessarily slow, as extreme care and circumspection has to be used in creating the organisations and establishing

the necessary communications. Immediate results should not be asked for or expected. Where results of value are now being obtained, i.e. Norway, Yugoslavia, Poland, etc., these are the outcome of long patience, enabling the construction of an organization which can operate effectively and is not easily disrupted.

There is still immense scope for development in this branch of warfare. The possibilities in all parts of the world are now being actively studied at the same time as existing fields are being further exploited, and all possible encouragement and support given.

Like the other Services, i.e. the Navy, Army and Air Force, S.O.2 are handicapped by the existing shortages of arms, of aircraft, of transport facilities, etc.; when these are made up, progress will quicken.

As explained in foregoing paragraphs, in some countries we are aiming at an eventual rising and in others at maintaining their neutrality, while in many countries we seek to make the utmost use of sabotage and propaganda as being the most effective immediate weapons. To effect this requires the fullest support that can be given in money, in materials, in wireless, in transport and communication facilities generally, the more assistance we can give, the more control do we exert over all activities and their sponsors, be they emigre governments or opposition leaders.

We are still far from the stage when a general uprising in any occupied country would be the slightest use to the Allied cause; it would be the reverse. Our policy for the immediate future must, it is suggested, be as follows:

To assist by all means in our power the organization and equipping of clandestine military forces in such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Norway.

To encourage in those and other occupied territories the greatest degree of sabotage, etc., that can be undertaken without inciting destructive reprisals.

In neutral countries to combat Axis interests, whether political or material, in every possible field, and in particular to combat "infiltration".

In enemy territory to instigate the highest degree of sabotage, espionage, propaganda, etc., that can be effective.

Subversion is a weapon which we can use offensively and continuously wherever the enemy's interests can be reached. Intangible and elusive, it is a form of attack which exerts a constant pressure and constitutes a continuous strain on his resources and his will. Ultimately, like subversion by the Germans, it depends for its success on the armed forces. But with us, and fortunately, this factor operates to a lesser degree. With some exceptions, the occupied nations did not want to be "subverted" by Hitler's tourists. When we are stronger

and can play the same game, it will be a very different thing. The Fifth Column of the future should be easier to control than the Fifth Column of Fascism, because its motive force will be superior in every way.

Yet if the S.O.E. is to be responsible for this work, provision must be made for their needs and intelligent, long-distance planning must take place here and now. Without the tools they cannot even begin, far less finish the job. For instance, it may well be desirable to allot a number of Sten guns for S.O. purposes. Further, the whole question of the relation of foreign forces in this country to S.O. activities has still to be thought out. Finally there is no doubt that, in the nature of things, there is often bound to be a conflict of view between S.O.E., who wish to "keep the pot boiling", and "C", who is above all interested to prevent any incident likely to result in Gestapo activity and hence unfavourably to affect his prospects of obtaining intelligence. This difficulty is real and cannot be buried. Minor differences of opinion can be, and are, successfully overcome, but differences of policy can only, in the last resort, be referred to the Chiefs of Staff for a ruling.

In any case there is no doubt that S.O.E., unless they are to lose their whole *raison d'être*, will have to train and infiltrate large numbers of agents during the coming year (between 400 and 500 men are already in training.) If they are to do this successfully, suitable aeroplanes in sufficient numbers must be made available, and secure communications ensured. On both these points the Chiefs of Staff have recently been approached and it is hoped that their support will be forthcoming. In any case, it would be helpful to the S.O.E. if the Chiefs of Staff could say whether they agree with the general picture as outlined above; whether they consider that the policy recommended is the right one; and, if so, whether they are prepared to make available to the S.O.E. the men and materials necessary for carrying it out.

. . . . .



Extract from paper entitled "Subversion", printed  
for the Police, October, 1940

P/154

AMUSE II.

P/154

REPORT OFFICE  
C. 1.

SECRET.

18th August 1940

My Dear Dalton.

In accordance with a decision of the War Cabinet of July 22nd. I understand that you will co-ordinate the activities of what are known as "D" and M.I.(R), and M.E., though it was then agreed that provisionally the various parties and bodies taking part in underground activities would, for the time being, continue to be administered by the Ministers responsible for them.

I consider the time has come for you to take over control of these various activities and I therefore request that you will take over the "D" organisation which has hitherto been under my

Yours sincerely,

Signed - W. L. L. FAX

The Right Honourable  
Hugh Dalton, M.P.

solve by friendly agreement, here again the matter must be submitted by both sides to higher authority. At the same time it is hoped, in the near future to establish a "Transport Pool

consisting/-

ANNEX II.

September 16, 1940.

(Most Secret)

C and D have agreed as follows :-

1. D is a separate, secret organisation, forming part of a larger organisation under the control of Mr. Dalton. The function of this organisation is the prosecution of subversion. For general purposes of administration and discipline, therefore, the D organisation comes under Mr. Dalton and not under the Foreign Secretary. The function of C, who operates under the control of the Foreign Secretary, is the collection, collation and distribution of secret information and intelligence.

2. At the same time D is intimately associated with C, both on historical and on practical grounds, and if he is to function efficiently, it must be with the friendly co-operation of C. There are three respects in which the interests of C and D may clash and the following measures have been agreed on in order to preserve harmony :-

(a) Projects

A project may quite possibly be good for purposes of subversion, but bad for purposes of intelligence.

If such a project comes before the D Board it will be the duty of the C representative on that Board to draw the attention of his Chief to any disadvantage in it which he may see. If C is then unable to reach an agreement with D on the point, it must be submitted to higher authority.

(b) Transport.

At the moment and in the immediate future it may well be that C and D will be competing for available transport. If there is a real clash of interests which it is impossible to solve by friendly agreement, here again the matter must be submitted by both sides to higher authority. At the same time it is hoped, in the near future to establish a "Transport Pool"

consisting/-

consisting of both ships and aeroplanes which should suffice for the purposes of both C and D.

(c) Communications.

C will continue to afford D such facilities for the use of S.I.S cyphers and communications as the requirements and security of S.I.S permit, but these communications will remain under the control of C. Should, for any reason, a telegram submitted by D for transmission by C, be rejected by the latter C will of course be informed, in which case he will endeavour to make other arrangements.

(d) Spheres of Interest.

These have already been defined in paragraph 1. It follows that, if D's agents collect intelligence other than that on specifically D affairs, it must be passed on to C before being circulated anywhere, even within the D organisation itself. Conversely, if any of C's men is in a position to perform or to recommend some act of subversion, C will get in touch with D before taking any action.

(e) Recruitment of Agents

D is at liberty to take the initiative in recruiting agents but can only definitely engage them with the knowledge and subject to appeal the approval of C or of C's representative.

(f) Finance.

The exact method of financing the D organisation will be left for further discussion.

UNIT 1501 T.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE

BERKELEY SQUARE W 1

Teletype No  
PROBATION 1000

Cable 2 01.

24 September 1940

I am sorry that I  
state it based on the meeting  
held yesterday afternoon of which  
I have formed the foundation of  
an agreement as to the division of  
functions between C and D.

Please let me know, as  
soon as possible, whether you con-  
cur or have any amendments to make.

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1. In order to be able to do this, it is necessary to have a good knowledge of the situation in the country. This is why it is important to have a good knowledge of the situation in the country. This is why it is important to have a good knowledge of the situation in the country.

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WP(40) 271

19 July 1940

2101

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34 OF THE PUBLIC HE JARD  
ACT 1958

C

11-11-11

As you will remember, we were in London some time ago with a view to creating in the Middle East service to counter enemy propaganda.

We have now been provided with a list of the Foreign Office, the Office of the Chief of Staff, and the War Office, with a view to making a selection of material which would fit in with the various interests concerned. The arrangements which have been made are, subject to your approval, with the Foreign Office (Mr. Gell), the War Office (Major General J. Macdonald Nesbitt) and Sir Campbell Stuart is that we should assign to an individual to General J. Nesbitt at the War Office and the War Office would be entrusted with the task of dealing with counter propaganda.

A suitable individual, Lieut.-Colonel L. J. Clayton, has been discovered and General Nesbitt is prepared to accept him if he is appointed. Further instructions have been drafted and agreed by the three authorities above, subject to your approval.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The cost involved is difficult to estimate at this moment, the expenditure will not be considered as either staff or accommodation but will be the cost of direct action of one sort or another. Owing to the outbreak of war in the Middle East, it is possible that there will be some change in attitude of the Arab tribes and it may, therefore, be that the work for which we were allocated, and the money will not now be required. This will, however, be for the activities suggested for some months, and it is, therefore, a consideration on the spot, it is pointed out that the money is still essential.

It is, therefore, recommended that the money should be allocated to/



2.

to Colonel Clayton may be approved and that authority may be  
give to allocate to him initially \$1,000 for use as may be  
required, with liberty to apply for further sum as may be  
necessary.

21st September, 1939.

*Copy in file*

*4711*

PROPAGANDA - EGYPT

*space*

By agreement with the War Office, you will proceed to join G.O.C.-in-C., Middle East, as G.S.O.1, Publicity.

(2) You will be paid from War Office funds and your appointment will be gazetted shortly.

(3) You will have at your disposal a sum of money not from War Office funds which will be used under your direction for propaganda of a clandestine nature with the following objects:-

(1) In general you will be responsible that the attitude of the tribes bordering on Libya is favourable to whatever operations may be contemplated by G.O.C.-in-C., Middle East.

(11) As regards Transjordan and the desert tribes, you will be responsible for assisting, by means of clandestine propaganda, whatever policy may best assist operations contemplated by G.O.C.-in-C., Middle East. In Abyssinia you will be responsible for whatever work may be required among the natives of Abyssinia, as opposed to Italian tribes and garrisons.

(4)

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(5) You are not responsible for and will not engage in propaganda dealing with the Italian garrisons in either Libya or Abyssinia. This work is being arranged separately, but in due course you should co-operate with Sir Campbell Stuart's representative ( ) who will be stationed at

(6) You will work, by means of staff who will not be, as a rule, military, unless you so desire; and in that case you will arrange the details direct with G.O.C.-in-C., Middle East. You are not responsible for and will not engage in press propaganda amongst the Egyptian population other than tribes, as this is being done by the Foreign Office through the Embassy.

(7) Amongst other methods which may commend themselves to you, the following may be considered:-

- (a) Production and distribution of gramophone records suitable for use in coffee shops.
- (b) Production and distribution of leaflets as and when required.
- (c) Founding and support of howiyahs particularly amongst the Senussi.
- (d) Production and distribution of any literature that may seem advisable and, in this connexion, a book is now being prepared in Arabic giving, from German documents and speeches, their view of the Arab race. It is hoped that this will be ready for press in about a fortnight and can be printed either in London or in Egypt.
- (e) You may consider it desirable to recommend the distribution at cheap rates of radio sets designed to take one station only, e.g., Daventry short wave, or local Egyptian station. It is possible to produce

such/

station/

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3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1952

such a set around AB and the exact rate at which they should be sold will, of course, be a matter for local consideration.

(8) As it is possible that the above activities, e.g., gramophone records, wireless sets, etc., may tend to secure a commercial value, you may consider it desirable to foster such a move and to train a number of commercial travellers, who would be calling on coffee shops, etc., with records and wireless sets, to spread information and propaganda by word of mouth which, as you will be the first to appreciate, is a valuable medium among the Arab peoples. If suitable agencies, e.g., coffee, sugar, sweets, etc., etc., are required to give value to these commercial activities, they will be provided.

(9) The possibility of the use of suitable films will be borne in mind. It would appear that there are two general lines on which action might be desirable in this connection, (a) the standard film shown in the local cinemas, and (b) the sub-standard film which might possibly have value if employed on a mobile van, possibly ostensibly engaged in selling requirements in the desert or visiting holyplaces. Should you require the development of this suggestion, you will inform us at the earliest possible date so that we may arrange for the production or selection of the necessary film. In this connection, it should be noted that the methods by which films are shown in cinemas are extremely complicated and it will probably be necessary to send you out expert advice on this subject.

(10) In every case where you require material from this country you will give us, as far as possible, the general line underlying your requirement. In addition, in any circumstances you may wish to ask for the detailed method of its execution, etc., if you wish a broadcast talk from the station.

station, this can be made and recorded in London and sent out to be put on as required, but it will be appreciated that a script for broadcasting, or indeed for films, is an expert document, the writer of which requires to know primarily the general policy at which he is aiming, e.g., a talk on the British Army and its task in the Middle East, might be done from the point of view of the might of Britain or the wealth of Britain, or war aims, or friendliness, and it will be important, even if a suggested script is produced by you, that there shall be a paragraph attached giving quite clearly (i) The audience which it is desired shall be mainly impressed, (ii) Their present feelings, (iii) The message which it is desired shall remain in their minds, and in this connexion it will be appreciated that not more than one simple message should be conveyed by one broadcast or one film.

Personnel.

(ii) The following individuals can be made available, some or all of whom may be of use:-

(i)

(ii)

(iii) Wortham. Formerly Editor of one or more papers in Cairo. Now employed in Fleet Street on "The Daily Telegraph". Interviewed and would be prepared to accept suitable appointment. Arabic perfect/

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ACT 1958

perfect and knowledge of Egyptian extensive.

- (17) Westbrook. Formerly Political Officer in the Western Desert (1918-20). This individual is very keen to do work for this Section, but it is not known at the moment as what he is employed. It is believed, however, that his name can be obtained.

Finance.

- (18) As a preliminary a sum of £1,000 will be paid into any account which you may nominate in Egypt for use by you and this will be replaced as required. The only commitment at the present moment is cash a month, which is being used for the foundation of hospitals in the Senusel areas bordering on Libya. In this connection you should liaise with Colonel S. S. Elshinnan, who is on General Cavell's staff and will be cognizant of your activities.

D.

19.3.22.